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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO THE
USE OF ALL WATER, BOTH SURFACE
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE
DRAINAGE AREA OF BEAR RIVER AND
ALL ITS TRIBUTARIES IN UTAH.
RICHARD M. ESKELSEN, VIRGINIA E.
ESKELSEN, and LaNEZ NORMAN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Supreme Court No. 900119

vs.
TOWN OF PERRY, a Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant and Appellee,

PETITION FOR REHEARING
THE APPELLANTS, above-named, hereby petition for a
rehearing of the above entitled case pursuant to Rule 35 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The appellants will be referred to as the "Eskelsens"
and the Town of Perry will be referred to as the "Town". References to the two volumes of files containing pleadings, motions,
orders, findings, and the judgment will be referred to as "R.
and to the transcript will be "Tr.

"

".

POINTS OF LAW AND FACT
The points of law and fact which the petitioners claim
that the Court has overlooked or misapprehended are as follows:

1.

The 1974 application to appropriate 0.015 of a

second foot of water, which was assigned to the Eskelsens, as
a matter of law, established a separate and new water right
and this issue should not be remanded to the trial court.
2.

The state engineer's memorandum decision on the

Eskelsen 1983 application did not establish

f,

the Town's prior

water right".
3.

There is no competent evidence in the record of

any pre-1903 water right owned by Perry.
4.

The evidence admittedly shows non-use of the

spring water by the Town from May, 1964 to 1984, and there is no
competent evidence as to the extent and period of use of water by
Mathews, the alleged lessee, sufficient to avoid the application
of the forfeiture for non-use statute.
These points will be discussed in the order stated
under appropriate headings.
ARGUMENT
THE 1974 NORMAN APPLICATION ESTABLISHED
A NEW AND SEPARATE WATER RIGHT
Application No. 43448 (29-1064) was filed by Neil D.
and Sylvia F. Norman on April 8, 1974, to appropriate water from
George Davis Spring.

Mr. Norman testified as follows:

If

Q. Do you recall getting a deed from Mrs.
Norman to you conveying a half interest in the
George Davis Spring?
!!

A. Well, at that time it was Mrs. Davis,
yes, she conveyed half interest to me.
-2-

"Q.

And you got it from Mrs. Davis?

M

Right.

A.

"Q.

She was your grandmother?

ff

A. Right. Then we filed on an additional
usage of this water to take in another household.
"Q. And that's the application you assigned
to Mr. Eskelsen?
"A.

Right.ff

(Tr. 131)

On cross-examination, Mr. Norman testified as follows:
ff

Q. Also, Mr. Norman, when you made an application with the state engineer, basically wasn't your
purpose in making the application that your grandmother had given you a half interest in the George
Davis Spring and you were trying to transfer that water
right from one home to a -- to your home, too, so you'd
have a half interest in the spring?
ff

A.

Correct, yes.

lf

Q. Okay. You weren't seeking to appropriate
another six gallons of water per minute -"Mr. Skeen: -- I object on the grounds that it's
entirely immaterial. The documents speak for themselves.
"The Court:
Go ahead.

I'll allow it.

I think it's relevant.

"Q. You weren't trying to appropriate another
six gallons of water per minute, you were just trying
to divide the 12 gallons a minute, six gallons to you
and six gallons to your grandmother, the Ruby Davis
home."
"A.

That was our intent, yes."

(Tr. 144-145)

Page 4 of the Supreme Court opinion is as follows:
"The trial court's decree does not mention the
1974 application. On appeal, the Eskelsens allege
that this omission is 'obviously error'. The record,
however, indicates that the 1974 application may have
been filed merely as a restatement of one of the half
interests in Davis's 1957 diligent claim and not as a
-3-

separate or new claim at all. The testimony of the
person who filed the application (Neil Dwayne Norman)
indicates that his purpose was to transfer his interest in the Davis diligence claim from one home to
another. He stated that he was not seeking to appropriate an additional water right. In terms of quantity,
this explanation makes sense; half of the diligence
claim would be 6 gallons of water per minute, which is
an amount similar to that stated in the 1974 application.
!l

Although it appears that the trial court's omission of the 1974 application from its decree was probably based on a finding that it was not a separate
claim, the court never made a formal finding to that
effect. We therefore remand this issue for the trial
court to make a specific finding as to the status of
the 1974 application. If the court concludes that the
application was merely a restatement of the diligence
claim, then pursuant to the foregoing discussion, the
Eskelsens hold no rights under that application. If,
on the other hand, the court concludes that the 1974
application is in fact a separate and new claim, then
the priority of the Eskelsen"s rights thereunder should
be determined in the same manner as their rights under
the 1983 application."
The 1974 application was not protested, was assigned to
the plaintiffs, was approved by the state engineer on July 18,
1974, and proof of appropriation was accomplished by an election
filed July 21, 1976. (R. 76-78)
certificated application.

It now has the same status as a

A copy of the application was attached

to Answers to Perry City's First Set of Interrogatories filed July
23, 1987 (R. 40-84), and was received in evidence. (Def. Ex. 12)
In petitioners1 memorandum filed March 6, 1989, pursuant to the court's memorandum decision, dated February 3, 1989,
the Eskelsens listed the 1974 water application, No. 43448, as
one of the water rights they owned. (R. 107)

A copy of the appli-

cation, marked Exhibit C, is attached,, (R. 121)

The 1974 applica-

tion is also attached to the Town Trial Brief (R. 230).
-4-

It will be noted that paragraph 13 of the application state
"13. Is this water to be used supplementally
with other water rights? Yes X No
. If "yes"
identify other water rights on page 2."
On page 2, under "Explanatory", it is stated:
year.

"Paragraph 13: 26 ac/ft of Pineview water per
Also 1/2 interest in Dil. Claim #538 (29-934)."

It is clear from the foregoing documents that the applicants intended the water right evidenced by the 1974 application,
discussed on pages 4 and 5 of this Court's opinion, to be supplemental to the water right evidenced by the Ruby Davis Diligence
Claim No. 538 filed in 1957.
It is apparent that this Court overlooked the language
of the application quoted above from paragraph 13 and under the
heading, "Explanatory".
the district court.

There should be no remand of the issue to

The water right should be recognized as a

perfected, separate and new water right by the filing of the
"Election" in lieu of proof of appropriation as stated in line 22
of the "State Engineer's Endorsements" on the last page of the
application.

The acceptance of an "Election" in lieu of proof is

authorized by the last paragraph of Section 73-3-16, Utah Code.
Although it is established by the express language of
the application, quoted above, that the 1974 application was a new,
separate and supplemental water right to the Ruby Davis diligence
claim, we point out that there is no statutory provision which
authorizes the filing of a water application as a restatement of
a diligence claim.

All perfected applications to appropriate water
-5-

are new and separate water rights with a priority of the date of
filing for the quantity of water, purpose of use, and period of
use therein specified.

This is the law,

THE STATE ENGINEER'S MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON ESKELSENS1 1983 APPLICATION
DID NOT ESTABLISH THE TOWN'S PRIOR RIGHT
The Eskelsens filed their 1983 Application, No. 59399
(29-2973), to appropriate water from the George Davis Spring.
(Def. Ex, 12)

It is stated in this Court's opinion, page 5:

"At that time, the Town was already in the
process of making improvements to its collection
system- The Eskelsens had knowledge of the improvements and the fact that the Town was claiming water
rights in the spring area- The state engineer
approved the Eskelsens1 application subject to the
Town's prior rights.
The trial court found that
1
the Eskelsens 1983 application is valid but that
the right secured thereby is subject to the Town's
claim and the conditions of the state engineer's
approval.
"The trial court's finding that the Eskelsens
have a valid water right under their 1983 application is correct. Moreover, the Eskelsens may have
a water right under the 1974 application, as discussed
earlier. The priority of any water right held by the
Eskelsens, however, is subject to the rights of any
senior appropriators under section 73-3-21 of the
Utah Code...."
The state engineer's memorandum decision is quoted in
note 6.

The decision states that:
"The Division of Water Rights is presently
working in the area in an effort to determine the
extent of the Rights of Perry City which will be
evidenced by Water User's Claim No. 29-2869
"
The decision states further:
"It is, therefore, ordered and Application
No. 29-2973 (A59399) is hereby APPROVED, subject
to prior rights and the conditions as stated above."
-6-

It should be noted that all approvals of applications
by the state engineer are "subject to prior rights11.

It is clear

(1) that the state engineer did not, as stated in this court's
opinion quoted above, approve the application subject to the
Town's prior rights, and (2) that at most it is implied that the
state engineer thought that there were prior rights and an effort
was being made to determine the extent of such rights if any.
All of the foregoing statements quoted from the opinion
have no legal significance, because, as this Court has held and
it is established law, the state engineer has no judicial power
and no authority to determine water rights.
Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P2d 748;
United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 P2d
1132; Rehearing denied 121 Utah 18, 242 P2d 774.
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
THAT PERRY OWNED ANY PRE-1903 WATER RIGHT
This Court's opinion correctly states on page 6:
"Because neither the Town nor its predecessors
ever filed a statutory application to appropriate
with the state engineer, whatever water right the
Town has must necessarily rest upon appropriation
by beneficial use before 1903."
It is quoted in the opinion that the trial court stated:
"While no one testified to all the uses made
of the water by the original land owners, the records
indicate that irrigation, domestic, household and
stockwatering uses were made." (Opinion, pp 6,7)
The opinion then states that the trial court relied on:
(1) Records of the Box Elder County Recorder's
Office indicating that ,fas early as 1892 the Stokes
family entered into contracts with Stark Brothers for
the purchase of trees for an orchard containing 50
acres", and (2) two 1983 affidavits." (Opinion, p. 7)
-7-

RECORDS OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
The only record supporting the statement regarding the
purchase of trees by James Stokes is Entry 3 in the Abstract of
Title, No. B462 (Ex. 31) which states:
"Instrument recites that, said party of the
first part, in consideration of second parties
furnishing him 740 trees as per order given by
first party, binds himself to plant in the usual
and customary manner, to take good care of same,
said trees to be planted on his farm situate in
Box Elder County, State of Utah, and more particularly described as follows, to-wit: Section 36,
T. 9N. R. 2W. containing 50 acres, for which said
first party binds himself and his heirs to pay the
said second party the sum of $113.75, due and payable as follows: One half of the gross amount of
the sales of the crop each year, said first party
agrees to remit, which is to be credited hereon
from year to year until the full amount together
with 6% compound interest shall be paid and the
final payment shall be made within 10 years from
date regardless of the amount paid from year to
year, if the amount shall not be paid prior thereto.
And it is also understood and agreed that this shall
be a lien upon the above described premises or real
estate until the full amount together with interest
shall be paid and should said first party fail to
pay the amount together with interest, said real
estate shall be subjected to the payment of the
above amount.11
Entry 3 was recorded Jan. 18, 1892. Entry 16 of the
Abstract of Title is a State patent dated Feb. 21, 1907, recorded
April 10, 1907, conveying to James Stokes the West half of the
Southeast quarter of Section 36, Township 9 North, Range 2 West,
containing 80 acres.

Defendant's Exhibit 13 contains an uncerti-

fied copy of a United States patent to James Stokes, dated June
11, 1897, conveying to him the Southwest quarter of the abovementioned Section 36.
-8-

It will be noted that there is no description of the
land where the purchased trees were to be planted except "Section
36, T9N, R2W, containing 50 acres...11. There is nothing in the
record to show that the trees were actually planted in any of
the land now owned by Perry or by the Eskelsens and were irrigated
with water from the spring area here involved.

Certainly this is

no evidence of a water right.
THE TWO 1983 AFFIDAVITS
On page 7 of this Court's opinion it is stated:
!l

In addition, the Town introduced two 1983
affidavits. In one, Phillip Douglas Quayle, aged
73, stated he remembered that when he was a young
man a family by the name of Stokes owned land on
the east bench of the Town of Perry: 'I recall
that the Stokes Family developed certain springs,
made catch basins, and used the water to irrigate
crop land, stock, orchards and grapes. I was informed that they began developing their springs
prior to the 1900s.1 In a similar affidavit, Lisle
Larsen stated, '[The Stokes family] used this water
continuously I am told from prior to 1900 to the
time they sold the property to the Town of Perry
in 1917.'". (Emphasis added)
The affidavits referred to above were included in
Defendant's Exhibit 9 which is a statement of water users claim.
The testimony of Robert Fotheringham, area engineer of the Logan
office of the State Engineer, Division of Water Rights, (Tr. 153)
is that he had in his possession

lf

....a copy of our working file"

which is marked as Defendant's Exhibit 9.

(Tr. 154,155)

The

water users claim was not filed in the main office of the State
Engineer in Salt Lake City, and was not stamped and filed in the
area office.

(Tr. 188)
-9-

An objection was made to the water user's claim as follows:
M

Mr. Skeen: Well, if the court please, I
object to the Exhibit 9 for the reason that it
shows on its face that it's not supported by any
evidence. It's too vague to substantiate any
flow of water. It shows on its face that there's
no change application filed to change the nature
of use from irrigation to municipal. And that
it's an obvious effort made by -- after reviewing
the contents of it to create some kind of a water
right for the town of Perry. And I -- I think
based on that, the statement of water user's claims
should not be received." (Tr. 191,192)
The trial court received Defendant's Exhibit 9 in
evidence with the following comment:
"The Court: I'll receive it based on the
fact that it's offered to show the file, not
necessarily for the truthfulness of any of the'
material contained therein. So I'll accept it
for that purpose just as an indication of the
file. You may proceed." (Tr. 192) (Emphasis added)
On cross-examination Mr. Fotheringham admitted that the
claim did not show a description of any parcel of land that was
irrigated in the early days.

(Tr. 200)

It is abundantly certain that water users claim, Exhibit
No. 9, had no legal standing.

It consisted of working papers, in-

cluding the two affidavits, and was received by the trial court
as indicated above:

"....not necessarily for the truthfulness of

any material contained therein.

So I'll accept it for that pur-

pose just as an indication of the file....".

(Tr. 192)

The affidavits, which together with the reference in
the county records of the purchase of fruit trees, are the only
evidence of water use prior to 1903, are obviously hearsay and
not admissible under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 802.
-10-

PRE-1903 QUANTITY OF WATER USED
The proof of a quantity of water used by the Townfs
predecessors before 1903 is discussed on page 7 of the opinion.
It is stated that former employees of the Town said that there
was a flow of 1/3 of a second foot in the 1960s and that a measurement was made in July 1984 after improvements were made to the
Town's water system in 1984. The concluding sentence states:
n

The Eskelsens correctly assert that the evidence
as to the Stokeses1 use of a given quantity of water
from the spring area before 1903 is vague."
Despite the above statement that the evidence is vague,
the Court, in the next paragraph, concluded that the "showing11 was
sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the Town's
water right in 1/3 second foot was initiated prior to 1903.
We quote:
n

In the past, this court has held that vague
and indefinite evidence might be insufficient to
establish pre-1903 beneficial water use. See
Mt. Olivet Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 65
Utah 193, 235 P. 876, 878 (1925); Richfield Cottonwood Irr. Co. v. City of Richfield, 84 Utah 107,
34 P.2d 945, 949 (1934) . Those cases, however, were
decided many years ago, when it was realistic to
expect that more direct and specific evidence about
pre-1903 water use should be available. In 1991,
however, it would be overly burdensome and unrealistic for us to require a water user to produce
unquestionable, overwhelmingly clear evidence of
water use. Rigid standards regarding proof of
amounts would be virtually insurmountable barriers
to old claims. In this case, the Town presented
the best information available, and the Eskelsens
did not present any evidence in rebuttal. The
evidence does establish pre-1903 water use with a,
reasonable certainty. Balancing the equities and
taking into account the amount of time that has
passed, we conclude that the showing was sufficient
to support the trial court's conclusion that the
Town's water right in 1/3 second foot was initiated
prior to 1903.ff
-11-

In the above-quoted paragraph this Court (1) disregards the basic law of water rights stated in the cases cited,
and (2) indulges in judicial legislation by stating that "....In
1991, however, it would be overly burdensome and unrealistic for
us to require a water user to produce unquestionable, overwhelmingly clear evidence of water use.

Rigid standards regarding

proof of amounts would be virtually insurmountable barriers to
old claims....".
This Court ignores the fact that although the Town
acquired the land to which it claims water rights were appurtenant in 1917 (Stokes), 1921 (James S. Stokes), and 1929 (Call),
it filed no change application pursuant to the laws requiring
the filing of change applications.

See Defendant's Exhibit 13.

The laws requiring the filing of change applications were enacted
in 1919, 1937, and 1939. Also, it filed no claim as required
by Section 100-5-12, Chapter 105, Laws of Utah, 1935.

It com-

pletely ignored the law.
The change application provision in Laws of Utah, 1919,
Ch. 67, Section 8, is "....no change of point of diversion, place
or purpose of use shall be made except on the approval of an
application of the owner by the State Engineer.".

Laws of Utah,

1937, Ch. 130, Section 1, 100-3-3, and Laws of Utah, 1939, Ch.
Ill, Section 1, 100-3-3, each provide:
"Any person who changes or who attempts to
change a point of diversion, place or purpose of
use, either permanently or temporarily without
-12-

first applying to the state engineer in the
manner herein provided, shall obtain no right
thereby and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
each day of such unlawful change constituting
a separate offense, separately punishable."
Section 12, Chapter 105, Laws of Utah, 1935, provides:
"Within one year after the date of the
approval of this act, all claimants to rights
to the use of underground waters shall file
notice of such claim or claims, with the state
engineer on forms furnished by him, setting
forth such information as the state engineer
may require, including but not limited to the
following:
"The name and postoffice address of the
person making the claim; the location of the
well or tunnel or other means of diversion
with reference to a United States government
survey corner; the nature and extent of use on
which claim of appropriation is based; the flow
of underground water used in cubic feet per
second or the quantity in acre feet; the time
during which underground water has been used
each year and the date when underground water
was first used,
"Failure to file notice of claim or claims,
as provided in this section, shall be prima
facie evidence of intent to abandon such claimed
right or rights, and in the distribution of the
underground waters of this state the state engineer may disregard any claim not so filed."
The Town's difficulty in obtaining evidence would not
have arisen if it had complied with the statutes referred to and
quoted above.

The statement, "....In this case, the Town pre-

sented the best information available, and the Eskelsens did
not present any evidence in rebuttal", is inappropriate in view
of the fact that no competent evidence was introduced by the
Town.
-13-

THERE WAS PARTIAL FORFEITURE FOR NONUSE
The evidence adduced by the Town to show use is summarized in the Reply Brief of Appellants on pages 8 to 10, with
references to the page numbers in the transcript.

Jay, a nephew

of Elmer Mathews, testified that his uncle, starting in April
and ending in July, watered a couple of rows of cherries and a
row of peaches with spring water.
peach row.

(Tr. 241,242)

After July he would water his

Paul Barnard, Mayor of the Town from

1978 to 1982, testified that Elmer used the water while he was
mayor.

(Tr. 254)
Finding of Fact No. 30 is that: the Town "....has

maintained its water rights through servicing of culinary water
to at least 2 homes and renting of the water to an individual
for irrigation for each year from 1964 to 1984, when Perry was
able to place the water back into its culinary water system11.
(R. 267)

In Conclusion of Law No. 7 the trial court stated that

a water right could not be forfeited for nonuse if, during a
five year period, any water is beneficially used.

(R. 270,270a)

If the findings of fact and evidence are viewed most
favorably to the Town, the maximum flow of water used by anyone
from 1964 to 1984 would be water sufficient for two homes, 0.030
of a second foot, and 1/3 of a second foot during the irrigation
season from April to October.

The water right to 1/3 second foot

not used during the period from October to April (6 months) was
forfeited for nonuse.
In the Court's opinion, it is stated, page 10, that
fl

....The water in this case was continuously applied to a beneficial
-14-

use from which the Town also benefited, even though it violates
the Constitution in acquiring the benefit....".

In holding

that the Town continuously applied the water to beneficial use,
the trial court and this Court overlooked the fact that during
the 6 month non-irrigation season the water was unused.
CONCLUSION
The Eskelsen Petition for Rehearing should be granted
for the reasons (1) the 1974 application, which states under
"Explanatory" that it is supplemental to the Ruby Davis claim,
is definitely a separate and new water right, and, as a matter of
law, there can be no water application to restate a diligence
claim; (2) the state engineer's decision approving the 1983 application does not state and as a matter of law cannot state
that it is subject to a water right of the Town; (3) there is
no competent evidence to support a pre-1903 water right owned by
the Town; and (4) the evidence adduced to prove beneficial use
of water from 1964 to 1984 by the Town or its lessee does not
cover the non-irrigation season and, as a matter of law, the
right to 1/3 of a second foot for the 6 month irrigation season
was forfeited for nonuse.
Respectfully submitted,

fxJQJfapQ<\A ^
E. J. SKE£N
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 359-2329
Attorney for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main
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